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CAN REVERSE ENGINEERING OF SOFTWARE EVER BE
FAIR USE? APPLICATION OF CAMPBELL'S
"TRANSFORMATIVE USE" CONCEPT
John A. Williams*
Abstract: Several years after Atari v. Nintendo and Sega v. Accolade, debate and
confusion remain within the U.S. software industry and legal community concerning the
appropriate application of copyright's fair use doctrine to reverse engineering of software.
This Comment discusses why and how the U.S. Supreme Court's recent fair use analysis in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music should be applied to help resolve the reverse engineering issue.
Not only would application of Campbell's approach promote consistency among courts and
confidence within the software industry, but it also would safeguard copyright's ultimate
objective: the advancement of society's growth in science and art.

"[O]ne must not manacle science. "'
"Libertyfinds no refuge in ajurisprudenceof doubt."2

As the above quotations illustrate, copyright law must be flexible
enough to promote intellectual growth but at the same time heed the U.S.
Supreme Court's warning that legal principles need certainty and
stability in their application to be effective. If copyright law's fair use
doctrine3 had been codified in bright-line rules, determining whether
someone made an excusable copy of copyrighted material would be a
relatively straightforward procedure. Rather than provide such bright-line
rules, Congress chose to enact a vague provision that merely gives
statutory recognition to the doctrine's "equitable rule of reason"
principle.4 Unfortunately, this principle historically has served as a
flexibility device with no boundary or standard other than the caveat that
its application ultimately should somehow foster intellectual creativity.

* B.S. Electrical Engineering 1992, University of Washington.
1. Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (1803) (first case to allude to fair use doctrine).
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992).
3. Section 107 of the Copyright Act allows copyrighted material to be used without authorization
if the infringing use is a "fair use." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (discussing fair use statute). For
discussion of "fair use," see infra part I.B.
4. Under an "equitable rule of reason" principle, a court decides a case according to its perception
of what a fair outcome would be based on the case's specific facts. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (first U.S. case to allude to "fair use"). See infra part ll.B.
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In the case of reverse engineering of software5 presented in Sega
Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc.,6 the Ninth Circuit applied an "equitable
rule of reason" analysis viewed by many commentators, legal
practitioners, and copyright law experts as not only confusing and
unpersuasive, but also nontraditional.7 Some commentators have even
questioned whether the fair use doctrine is ever capable of adequately
addressing the issue of reverse engineering.8 When addressing questions
from abroad regarding the U.S. position on reverse engineering, the U.S.
government also appears to be confused by and at odds with Sega's fair
use analysis.9 This confusion undoubtedly affects the U.S. software
industry's potential for growth and advancement.' 0
Rather than rely on Sega's unpersuasive analysis, cour:s and Congress
should look to the U.S. Supreme Court and the Constitution for guidance
when addressing the issue of reverse engineering of software and fair
use." In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 2 the U.S. Supreme Court
applied an excellent fair use analysis in the context of parody that
answers most questions concerning the fair use doctrine's applicability to
reverse engineering of software.
This Comment illustrates how Campbell's analys;is provides a
persuasive and clear approach for determining when a reverse
engineering of software qualifies as fair use. This Comment begins with
an overview of copyright law, including its purposes and limitations.
Next, it discusses Sega's facts, analysis, and weaknesses. It then
discusses the facts and holdings of Campbell. Last, this Comment argues
why Campbell's approach should be adopted when determining whether
a reverse engineering of software is excusable as fair use.

5. See infra part II.A.
6. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. See infra notes 59, 101-02 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., S. Carran Daughtry, Reverse Engineering of Software for Interoperability and
Analysis, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 145 (1994); A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Casefor Copyright Thanfor
PatentProtection of Computer Programs,72 Neb. L. Rev. 351 (1993); John C. Phillips, Sui Generis
IntellectualPropertyProtectionfor ComputerSoftware, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev 997 (1992).
9. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.

11. Copyright law originates from the Constitution's copyright and patent clause. U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. 114 S. Ct. 1164, remand,25 F.3d 297 (6th Cir. 1994).

Reverse Engineering and the Transformative Use Concept
I.

COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE FAIR USE EXCEPTION

A.

Copyright's Goal andIts Protection of Software 3

"To promote the progress of science and the useful arts," the
Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to provide incentives
for the dissemination of new works. 4 Pursuant to this grant of authority,
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976" ("the Act") which provides
special protection for the expression embodied in works of authorship. 6
Under Congress's plan, the Act awards authors certain exclusive
rights over their works of authorship, 7 including the right to reproduce
their works, 8 to prepare derivative works, 9 to distribute copies of their
works," and to perform or display their works in public.2' An act
inconsistent with any of the copyright owner's exclusive rights
constitutes infringement.22 To prove infringement, the copyright owner
must establish that a valid copyright exists23 and that an unauthorized
"copy" was made.24 However, even when a plaintiff proves infringement
occurred, a court will excuse it if the defendant satisfies a statutory
exception.' These exceptions exist because copyright's intermediate
13. Software also can be protected under patent law. See generally In Re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Marshall Leaffer, UnderstandingCopyright Law 22, 82-83 (2d ed. 1995).
14. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
15. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C. (1994)).
16. Copyright protection extends over only the expression of a work's ideas rather than over the
ideas underlying the expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). For example, copyright protection can
extend over a play's script but not over its underlying plot. The only requirement for copyright is that
the expression be original, meaning that it was independently created by its author, copyright does
not require the expression to be novel or unique. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340,345-48 (1991).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
18. § 106.
19. § 106. A "derivative work" is based on an original copyrighted work, such as a screenplay
based on a novel, and is still considered a copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994).
20. § 106.
21. § 106. See also 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994).
22. § 106. See also § 501.
23. § 106. See also § 501; Leaffer, supra note 13, at 285-86 (discussing infringement).
24. A "copy" is defined as a material object in which a work is fixed and from which the work can
be perceived or reproduced, either directly or with the help of a machine or device. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
To show that an unauthorized "copy" exists, the copyright holder must first prove that the defendant
had appropriated copyrighted material, and then that this was a misappropriation. William PatTy,
Latman's The Copyright Law 191 (6th ed. 1986).
25. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994).
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creative efforts, is sim-ply a means to
goal, the rewarding of authors'
26
purpose.
ultimate
copyright's
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's recurring statement that copyright
law's objective is to promote the constitutional mandate of advancing
society's intellectual growth through the dissemination of works of
authorship,27 other views also have developed. These hav e been derived,

however, from merely copyright law's peripheral airrs: (1) to justly
reward authors for their creative efforts; 28 and (2) to provide incentive for
authors to produce creative works.29
Similarly, although Congress declared in 1980 that computer software
is copyrightable,3 ° differing views still exist as to what Congress
intended.3' But because software is inherently a literary work with both
creativity and functionality,32 and whose technological advancements

26. See Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. CopyrightLaw 5 (Comm. Print 1961) ("As reflected
in the Constitution, the ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is to foster the growth of learning
and culture for the public welfare, and the grant of exclusive rights to authors for a limited times is
means to that end."); see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 1.99 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991).
27. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1029-30 (1994); Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50;
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 222 (1990); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 545-46, 558-59 (1985); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 428-29 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Co. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v.
Stein. 347 U.S. 201. 219 (1954); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer
Documents, Reverse Engineering, and ProfessorMiller, 19 Dayton L. Rev. 975, 978-79 (1994);
Oddi, supra note 8, at 358 n. 11; Peter A. Wald et al., Standards for Interoperabilityand the
Copyright Protectionof Computer Programs,390 Practising Law Institute 481, 481-83 (1994).
28. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 546: see also Stewart.495 U.S. at 229.
29. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450.
30. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,117 (1994).
31. The only available evidence of Congress's reasons for protecting computer programs is one
short paragraph in a congressional report. This paragraph merely stated that Congress chose to adopt
the recommendations of a specially appointed commission, The National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). See H.R. Rep. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 1, 23-24 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482-33. CONTU believed
software programs were creative literary works that deserved copyright protect on to encourage their
creation and broad dissemination. Final Report of the National Commission o a New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works 10-13 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU Report]. The CONTU Report
generally is regarded as the authoritative guide to Congress's intent behin- codifying software
copyrightability. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992); Arthur
R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated
Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 1022 (1993).
32. "'Literary works' are works... expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical
symbols." 17 U.S.C. § 101. "Functional works" are those which people cannot easily read, listen to
or view but rather serve some specific function. See Leafier, supra note 13, at 73-76.
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heavily depend on the utilization of creative ideas,33 only one of
copyright's asserted aims is relevant for its protection. Copyright
protection is needed to encourage the public dissemination of new
software which, in turn, will further34 the constitutional goal of advancing
technology and intellectual growth.
B.

The FairUse Exception

Even though awarding limited monopoly protection to works of
authorship will serve copyright's purpose, Congress recognized that in
some instances broad protection would stifle, rather than promote,
copyright's ultimate aim. Consequently, Congress enacted statutory
exceptions to pardon infringements that the Act would otherwise
prohibit,36 including the fair use exception 7 addressed by this Comment.
Originally, the fair use doctrine was a common-law principle based on
the "equitable rule of reason"38 and has changed very little in substance39
since first being articulated in 1841.4 When codifying the fair use
doctrine, Congress intended to give statutory recognition only to the
33. See Gary R. Ignatin, Let the Hackers Hack. 140 Pa. L. Rev. 1999, 2014-22 (1992); Kajala,
supra note 27. at 976-85, 996-98 (discussing how software technology advances incrementally by
utilizing existing ideas); see also Feist Publications. Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 34950 (1991); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1109, 1112
(1990).
34. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1029-30 (1994).
35. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
36. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The statute provides:
[Tihe fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified. . . , for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is ofa commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.
38. See supranote 4 for explanation of"equitable rule of reason."
39. Leaffer, supra note 13, at 318-19.
40. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
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existing "equitable rule of reason" principle.4' Hence, Congress did not
provide a concise definition or rule for fair use, and as a result, fair use
has been described as "the most troublesome area in copyright law."42
The U.S. Supreme Court defined fair use as the privilege to use
another's copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the
copyright owner's consent. 43 In an attempt to balance: the rights of
existing copyright owners with the aim of promoting the dissemination
of new intellectual works that benefit society, the Court has utilized the
fair use exception to prevent rigid application of the Act which might
otherwise frustrate intellectual growth."
In determining whether an infringement is fair use, the statute
mandates courts to always consider at least four factors: (1) the purpose
and character of the infringement; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality45 of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the infringement upon
the potential market for or value of the original and its derivative
works.4 6 In addition to a general presumption against findings of fair use,
courts, until Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 47 identified the following
characteristics within each fair use factor, respectively, as presumptively
weighing against fair use: (1) the infringement served a commercial or
monetary purpose; 48 (2) the copyrighted work was either unpublished or
of a non-factual or creative nature;49 (3) the entire copyrighted work was
copied;5" and (4) the infringement involved a commercial purpose, which
strongly indicates that the work would suffer unfair marke: harm. 5'
41. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107, Historicaland Statutory Notes (West 1977 & Supp. 1995). See also Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,451 n.31 (1984).
42. Leaffer, supra note 13, at 319 (citing Iowa State Univ. Res. Found., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
43. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
44. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S.
207, 236 (1990).
45. "Substantiality" means the importance or significance or value of that portion utilized from
the original. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107, supranote 37.
47. 114 S.Ct. 1164.
48. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
Butsee Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1174; infra part III.B.1 (discussing how a commercial purpose is not
a dispositive indication of an unfair use).
49. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985).
50. Id. at 560; Sony, 464 U.S. at 450.
51. Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51. But see Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177 (discussing how a dispositive
presumption is inapplicable under circumstances that are different from Sony).
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The four statutory factors were not meant to be exhaustive, 52 however,
and Congress intended no factor to carry more weight than any other. 3
The intent behind drafting flexibility into the statute was to allow courts
to adapt the fair use doctrine to society's evolving needs, especially
during times of rapid technological change. 4 Unfortunately, it is this
flexibility that causes the current uncertainty as to how fair use should
apply, if at all, to reverse engineering of software. 5
II.

CASE LAW ON REVERSE ENGINEERING OF SOFTWARE

Although many software developers now engage in some amount of
reverse engineering, the industry remains uncertain as to the extent this
practice is legal under the fair use statute.5 As a result, many software
developers are hesitant to invest in the expensive research and
development required to create highly sophisticated and innovative
software. 57 Despite two recent court cases holding that reverse
engineering can be fair use as a matter of law,58 confusion and debate
remain and will continue59 unless courts or Congress clarify the issue.
A.

Reverse Engineeringof Softiware

Although software programs are considered literary works under the
Act, their unique characteristics differentiate them from traditional
52. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175-81; Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-57.
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Leaffer, supra note 13, at 322. In the past, the U.S. Supreme Court
viewed the fourth factor as being the most significant. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990);
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. However, the Court has now implied that the first factor is as
equally important as the fourth. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171-72.
54. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
55. See generally Oddi, supra note 8, at 351-58; D.C. Toedt III, Why Are We Re-Inventing the
Wheel? Arguments Against Copyright Protection for Command-Driven Software Interfaces, 5
Software L.J. 385 (1992).
56. This information was received from informal discussions with copyright law and software
licensing attorneys in the Seattle area. See also infra note 59 and accompanying text.
57. See Ignatin, supra note 33, at 2022. If the fair use doctrine remains in its current state of
confusion, investors will be less enthusiastic to risk capital for new expensive software if others
easily can exploit the programmer's creative efforts. See Oddi, supra note 8, at 366. Cf Software
Patent Hearings, Softlaw Outlook I (Christensen O'Connor Johnson Kindness, Seattle, Wash.,
Spring 1994) (discussing effects from uncertainty of software patents).
58. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
59. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmeron Copyright 13-215 (1995); Pamela
Samuelson, FairUsefor ComputerProgramsand OtherCopyrightable Works in DigitalForm, 1 J.
Intell. Prop. L. 49 (1993).
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literary works such as books, films, and music. Software is distributed to
the public only in a machine-readable format known as object code,
rather than in a human-readable form known as source code.6" Also,
software has machine-like characteristics in that it is created solely to
of
make computers function in certain ways. Hence, unlike most types
61
copyrightable works, software is said to have specific functionality.
In simple terms, reverse engineering of software is the process in
which one takes apart ("reverse engineers") a program to learn how it
operates and how it was created. Through reverse engineering, one can
access and copy uncopyrightable elements, as well as copyrighted
expression, hidden within software. This process requires the program's
object code to be converted into human-readable source code. Only after
the source code is obtained can a reverse engineer fully understand what
exactly makes a program operate the way it does.62
The only reverse engineering processes that allow a complete analysis
of software are known as "disassembly" and "decompilation." In either
process, a program's object code is first copied and then translated into a
human-readable source code program. 63 "Reverse eragineering for
interoperability" is a specific type of reverse engineering.' It allows one
to obtain an existing program's hidden compatibility specifications so
that a new program can operate and interface with that existing program
or with other software and hardware.65
Because reverse engineering involves intermediate copying of an
original program and building the source code program is the creation of
a derivative work of the original, both acts violate the exclusive rights
granted to the copyright.66 Building the source code program is
considered an infringement because it is a derivative work of the original
object code program. 61 It is essentially a translation of an original work,
similar to a Spanish translation of Catcherin the Rye.

60. Object code exists strictly in computer language that only a computer can readily decipher.
Source code, however, is what programmers actually write before a compiler converts the source
code into object code. See Ignatin, supranote 33, at 1999-2003; Karijala, supra note 27, at 991-92.
61. See Ignatin, supra note 33, at 1999-2003; Karjala, supra note 27, at 991-)2.
62. Ignatin, supranote 33, at 1998-2002.
63. Id. at 1999-2003.
64. Id. at 2000-03.
65. Nimmer & Nimmer, supranote 59, at 13-215.
66. Reverse engineering possibly could create additional acts of infringement. See, e.g., Apple
Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed,464 U.S. 1033
(1984); Ignatin, supra note 33, at 2010.
67. Ignatin, supra note 33, at 1999-2003.
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Reverse engineers, however, contend that conversion of object code
into source code is excusable under copyright's fair use doctrine. First,
they assert that copying software and creation of derivative works are
necessary steps for accessing a program's uncopyrightable ideas and
functions, which otherwise are unreadable in object code format. Second,
they argue that both acts of infringement are only intermediate and
temporary because neither incorporates an original's copyrightable
expression into final works. 8
B.

Uncertaintyof Fair Use's Application to Reverse Engineering

Commentators, legal scholars, and even countries differ as to whether
reverse engineering should be fair use.69 This controversy arises because
the reverse engineering process itself seems to weigh against fair use if
strictly examined under the Act's four factors.7" Yet, this process often is
the only viable means for accessing software's uncopyrightable, but
hidden, ideas and functions7' which, in turn, can be utilized to create new
and better software.72 Two appellate court cases, Atari Games Corp. v.
74
Nintendo of America, Inc. 73 and Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc.,
first recognized this problem when addressing whether reverse
engineering for interoperability could be fair use. Both courts concluded75
that reverse engineering could be fair use under certain circumstances,
but only the Sega court examined each of the four statutory factors.76
Hence, courts and Congress are more apt to rely on Sega than on Atari.
68. See Miller, supra note 31, at 1020-22.
69. See, e.g., Joseph Sofer et al., Software Reverse Engineering Under Review in Japan, 6 3.
Propriety Rts. 32 (1994); John Espenshade Titus, Right To Reverse Engineer Software: Is Japan
Next and Does It Really Matter?, 19 N.C. J.Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 49 (1994); Graeme Browning,
Code Breakers, The Nat'l J., Mar. 12, 1994, at 594 (discussing how most U.S. companies are
distressed that Japanese law may be amended to allow significant amounts of reverse engineering);
R. Duff Thompson, Position Paper on the Study of Protection of Computer Software Under Japanese
Copyright Law, Before the Collaborators Council of the Agency for Cultural Affairs (Dec. 13, 1993)
(on file with Washington Law Review). But see Peter Behr, A Software Fight's BlurredBattle Lines,
Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1994, at D3 (discussing how some U.S. companies favor Japan's proposal to
permit reverse engineering).
70. Patry, supra note 24, at 401; Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 59, at 13-218.
71. Copyright only protects the "expression" of ideas. See supra note 16.
72. See supranote 33 and accompanying text.
73. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
74. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
75. In Atari, the fact that the defendant's copy was purloined destroyed any chance for fair use.
975 F.2d at 843.
76. 977 F.2d at 1520-28.
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The Facts andHolding of Sega v. Accolade

Sega Enterprises ("Sega") manufactures and sells a videogame
entertainment system, known as "Genesis," comprised of a console and
videogame cartridges. Concerned about software piracy and its economic
survival, Sega created a "trademark security system" (TMSS) for its
Genesis console to prevent it from playing unauthorized videogames. To
be compatible with the Genesis console, a videogame cartridge had to be
programmed with the TMSS code. Sega licensed this copyrighted TMSS
code to other game developers."
Accolade, Inc. ("Accolade"), a developer of entertainment software,
abandoned its efforts to become a Sega licensee. Instead, Accolade
reverse engineered Sega's software to identify the compatibility
specifications for Genesis and incorporated this information into its own
videogames.78 Sega filed suit alleging that Accolade infringed its
copyright by engaging in "illegal reproductions and adaptations."79 In
response, Accolade offered four arguments to excu-se its reverse
engineering.8" The district court rejected all four arguments and held that
Accolade inexcusably infringed Sega's copyright.8 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit, although finding Accolade's reverse engineering to be an
infringement, excused it under the fair use doctrine.82
2.

The Ninth Circuit'sRationalein Sega

The Ninth Circuit reasoned that reverse engineering could be fair use
if it was the only means available for accessing the ideas and functional
concepts within "operations systems, system interface piocedures, and
other programs that are not visible to the user when operating. '83 But
rather than adopt a per se right to reverse engineer software, the court
stated that it would decide the issue on a case-by-case, equitable rule of

77. ld. at 1514-15.
78. Id. at 1514-16.
79. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
80. Accolade's four arguments were: (1) infringement does not occur unless its final products
from copying infringe original copyrighted works: (2) reverse engineering for ideis and functionality
is lawful per se under § 102(b) of the Copyright Act; (3) reverse engineering is lawful per se under
§ 117; and (4) reverse engineering is fair use under § 107. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1517.-18.
81. 785 F. Supp. at 1396-99.
82. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520.
83. Id.

264
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reason approach.84 After performing its fair use analysis, the court
concluded that the first, second, and fourth statutory factors supported
Accolade's fair use defense, and that the third factor was insignificant."
In examining the first fair use factor-the purpose and character of
Accolade's infringement--the court reasoned that although Accolade's
purpose was commercial in nature, other aspects favored fair use. The
court stated that Accolade's infringement was only intermediate, that any
commercial exploitation of Sega was merely incidental and indirect, and
that Accolade's direct purpose was to study the functional requirements
needed for Genesis-compatibility. From this rationale, the court
concluded that Accolade copied not for a commercial purpose, but
copied for a legitimate and beneficial purpose that led to public
dissemination of more works of authorship.86
In evaluating the fourth statutory factor--the purpose and character of
Accolade's infringement--the Ninth Circuit again applied its belief that
Accolade's infringement would cause Sega no substantial market harm.87
The court reasoned that although an infringement that would effectively
usurp the market of a copyrighted work was dispositively unfair, this rule
did not apply to an infringement that simply enabled the copier to
compete against the copied work.88 Believing that consumers would buy
more than one of the same videogame, the court held that Accolade's
infringement would not substantially harm Sega's revenue. 89 In addition,
the court stated that public policy favored competition, and hence, any of
Sega's "minor economic loss" was outweighed by public benefit.9
Under the second statutory factor--the nature of Sega's copyrighted
work-instead of focusing on the unpublished nature of Sega's
software, 9' the Ninth Circuit focused on the non-factual nature of Sega's
code.92 Although it recognized that the creative and non-functional
aspects of Sega's software constituted copyrightable expression, the
court reasoned that software in general is "unique" because it provides
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1527.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 1523-24.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1524.
91. The lower court focused on the unpublished nature of Sega's code. Sega Enters. v. Accolade,
Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1398 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Courts generally hold that the unpublished or nonfactual nature of the copyrighted work weighs against fair use. See supra text accompanying note 49.
92. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524.
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no viable means, other than reverse engineering, for a person to access
and utilize its uncopyrightable elements.93 It explained that by excusing
Accolade's reverse engineering, tie court ensured that Sega received
copyright protection only for its creative expression and not for its
functional aspects.94
Lastly, the court held that the third statutory factor-the amount and
substantiality of material copied from Sega's copyrighted work-carried
little weight. Although Accolade's reverse engineeing involved
intermediate copying of entire Sega software programs, the court
reasoned that Accolade's copying was limited to an intermediate step and
thus could cause only an indirect effect on Sega's market value.95
The court then concluded by declaring a new rule: When reverse
engineering is the "only way" available for gaining access to the ideas
and functional aspects of software, and when a "legitimate reason" exists
96
for such access, reverse engineering is fair use as a matter of law.
C.

The Shortcomingsof Sega

Sega's analysis is contrary to most prior decisions. Historically,9 7
courts have maintained a strong presumption against fiair use if an
infringement had a commercial purpose," copied the entire copyrighted
work, and caused substantial market harm to the original.99 Though
Sega's ultimate holding is based partially on not wanting to wrongfully
protect Sega's uncopyrightable ideas or inhibit the growth of creative

93. Id. at 1525--26. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (discussing how ideas, functions, and processes
are not protected by copyright law).
94. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526.
95. Id. at 1526-27.
96. Id. at 1527-28.
97. The term "historically" refers to those cases decided before Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). Campbell showed how the fair use doctrine is supposed to adapt when
needed to serve copyright's ultimate goal. Id. at 1165.
98. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442-50
(1984). Courts generally have not permitted aggressive, commercial competitors to rebut this
presumption but instead have reserved rebuttal for copying that has no financial effect on the
potential market of the infringed work. Joe L. Gage, Copyright Law and Reverse Engineering:Have
Recent Decisions Taken the Fairout of Use?, 46 Baylor L. Rev. 183, 197-98 (195'4).
99. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
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expression," ° its fair use analysis is unpersuasive because it fails to show
how it expressly relates to copyright's objective.' t
1.

FirstStatutory Factor:Purpose and Characterof the Infringement

Historically, there has been a presumption against fair use if the
infringement has a commercial purpose.'0 2 The Sega court glossed over
the commercial aspect of Accolade's reverse engineering, however. It
reasoned that Accolade's infringement was only an intermediate use and,
as such, could commit only indirect or derivative commercial
exploitation and thus cause only minor commercial harm.' 3'
The court's reasoning is unpersuasive, however. First, Accolade's
admitted purpose behind its infringement was to allow Accolade to
directly compete against Sega videogames, ' 4 which should have been
sufficient to convince the court that Accolade's ultimate aim was direct
commercial exploitation.10 5 The court asserted, however, that Accolade's
purpose was merely to study the functional requirements needed for
Genesis-compatibility, and thus, believed that its infringement only had a
minimal commercial aspect because of its "legitimate, essentially non100. 977 F.2d at 1523, 1526.
10 1. The court's holding that disassembly is fair use as a matter of law so long as it is "necessary"
and for a "legitimate reason," id. at 1527-28, also creates two requirements which are not only vague
but also unprecedented in copyright law. See David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond: A Beacon for Fair
Use Analysis... At Least As FarAs It Goes, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1131, 1188-90 nn.268--69
(1994); John T. Soma et al.. Software Interoperability and Reverse Engineering, 20 Rutgers
Computer & Tech. L.J. 189, 220-23 (1994). The only requirement for courts in a fair use analysis is
to weigh all four statutory factors. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51; see also Campbell,
114 S. Ct. at 1174 n.18 ("If the use is otherwise fair, then no permission need be sought or
granted.").
102. "'[E]very [unauthorized] commercial use of a copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright."' Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451). "The crux of the profit/nonprofit
distinction ... [is] whether the [secondary] user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 562 (1985). Before engaging in the first factor analysis, the court acknowledged the
tradition that if "copying is for a commercial purpose [it] weighs against a finding of fair use." Sega,
977 F.2d at 1522.
103. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522.
104. Id. By gaining interoperability, Accolade wanted to directly compete against Sega and
prosper in the Genesis videogame market, which it succeeded in doing. Id. at 1522, 1526.
105. By way of comparison, commentators generally have agreed that disassembly by a computer
science student to learn programming techniques should be permissible as fair use, but that
wholesale duplication and disassembly for financial gain should not. See, e.g., Victor de Gyarfas,
Sega v. Accolade: A Step Forwardfor Reverse Engineering,23 Sw. U. L. Rev. 571, 578 nn.160-61
(1994).
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exploitative purpose. ' Unfortunately, this reasoning fails to address the
commercial benefits Accolade had intended to secure through its
"research" of Sega's code. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
research itself is seldom performed unless there is some prospect of
financial gain and commercial success."0 7 Though the inherent "research"
nature of reverse engineering could always be characterized as serving a
legitimate purpose (e.g., accessing uncopyrightable elements), the
purpose of Accolade's reverse engineering was undeniably commercial.
It was a serious oversight by the court to not squarely address the
commercial benefits that accrued to Accolade.
Without any further discussion or detailed fact-finding, the court then
concluded by simply asserting that Accolade's infringement, regardless
of its commercial impact on Sega, conferred public benefit by
encouraging growth in creative expression through an increase in the
availability of videogames.' While growth of creative works is indeed
the overall objective of copyright law, copyright protection is to be
removed under fair use only when protection would needlessly stifle the
flow of other creative works into society. 9 Copyright protection is not
to be stripped from its owner whenever a fair use exception would cause
an increase in creative works."0 If software innovators are easily stripped
of the copyright incentives and rewards that first coaxed them into
producing and disseminating their works, the growth of creative works in
society undoubtedly will decrease."' Accordingly, because Sega had
invested significant resources in the creation of its Genesis entertainment
system and had already given licenses to other game developers, even
offering one to Accolade, the court should have more carefully
considered whether Sega's copyright needed protection against the fair
use doctrine to justly reward Sega's extensive efforts." 2
In sum, the Sega court should not have tried to trivialize the clear
commercial purpose behind Accolade's infringement. Instead, it should

106. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522-23.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994).
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). See Campbell,
Ct. at 1170; Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 562-64; Miller, supranote 31, at 1022.
Miller, supra note 31, at 1019-21.
112. Id. Note, this is not similar to the "sweat of the brow" argument that was rejected in Feist v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Unlike the factual compila:ion in Feist,Sega's
code was original, copyrightable matter. Compare id. at 359-60 with Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514-18.
107.
108.
109.
114 S.
110.
111.
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have determined whether the commercial purpose was outweighed by the
3
more important aim of intellectual growth.
2.

The Second Factor:Nature of the Copyrighted Work

The court's second factor analysis also is questionable. In holding that
software deserved a lower degree of protection than other literary works
because of its functional nature, 4 the court contradicted Congress's
intent in making software copyrightable. Congress intended to protect
softvare programs without regard to how ideas or functions were
embedded within these works." 5 By emphasizing how different software
is from other literary works, Sega carves a special niche in copyright law
that is not authorized by statute." 6 Moreover, copyright does not impose
a duty on copyright owners to allow unrestrained access to their works.' "
This principle is as true for software developers as it is for authors of
other types of literary works.
Rather than ignore Congress's intent, the Sega court should have
focused on the general nature of software development rather than on
software's functional nature and hidden ideas. The court could have
stated that the nature of creating new software usually requires building
on existing software ideas and functions, which generally are hidden
within object code until reverse engineering occurs.
3.

Third Factor:Amount and Substantialityof the OriginalCopied

The court's analysis here is the least persuasive. Although Accolade
made intermediate copies of entire Sega programs, the court held this to
be insignificant." 9 In its reasoning, however, the court made two errors.

113. See infra parts III.B.I., IV.A.2.a.
114. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524-27.
115. See CONTU Report, supranote 3 1, at 1, 9-22; Miller, supranote 3 1, at 1022-23.
116. See Miller, supra note 31, at 1022.
117. Commentators have questioned the court's generalization that software deserves less
copyright protection in spite of the fact that Sega's software unquestionably contained nonfunctional, copyrightable expression. See, e.g., Lloyd G. Farr, Sega v. Accolade: Another Generation
of Computer Program Copyright Cases Has Growing Pains, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 903, 926 (1993);
Gyarfas, supranote 105, at 577-78 nn.146-56; Miller, supranote 31, at 1022.
118. See infra parts 1II.B.3., IV.A.2.b.
119. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1992). But see Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (copying of entire copyrighted material generally
weighs against fair use).
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First, the court exclusively relied upon Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios. 20 Second, it contradicted itself in its rationale.
Although Sony holds that copying an entire work does not necessarily
preclude a finding of fair use,'2 1 Sega's reliance on Sony was misplaced.
The Sega court failed to recognize that Sony expressly limits its holding
to cases that involve "time-shifting."' 122 Reverse
engineering of software,
23
Sega.1
in
issue
sole
the
was
not time-shifting,
In addition, the court contradicted itself when it reasoned that
Accolade's infringement was insignificant because Accolade's ultimate
works made only a limited use of Sega's code.' 24 In ofaer words, the
court reasoned that only intermediate copying, and not permanent
copying, had caused the copyright infringement.2 2 Not only is this
inconsistent with the court's earlier statement that intermediate copying
is an infringement regardless of whether the end product of the copying
is an infringement,' 26 but it is contrary to copyright law's accepted notion
that intermediate copying is just as much an infringement as permanent
copying. 2 7 Even more importantly, under Sega's rationale, those who
reverse engineer software are given a privilege that historically has been
denied to infringers of other types of literary work. Segfa implies that
reverse engineers may copy as much software code as they want so long
128
as they limit the amount of code they use in their ultimate products.
This privilege clearly contradicts Congress's intent that copyright law
treat all literary works equally.'29 Accordingly, most courts have rejected
the proposition that intermediate copying deserves more lenient

120. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50).
121. 464 U.S. at 449-50.
122. Gage, supra note 98, at 198. "Time-shifting" means videotaping the original broadcast of a
show on a VCR in order to watch that show at a later time. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
123. Gage, supra note 98, at 198.
124. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526-27.
125. Although the court never explained how Accolade's ultimate use was only "limited" (and
thus insignificant), presumably the court meant that Accolade's final works (Genesis-compatible
videogames) contained no copyrighted expression and thus made only "limited" use from the
disassembly of Sega's software. Id.
126. Id.at 1518-19.
127. The Copyright Act is said to unambiguously proscribe "intermediate ,.opying." See id. at
1518, 1526-27 (stating this principle earlier but then ignoring it later); Walker v. University Books,
602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 87576 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
128. Miller, supra note 31, at 1018.
129. See supranotes 31, 115-16 and accompanying text.

Reverse Engineering and the Transformative Use Concept
treatment under fair use.130 Hence, instead of relying on rationale that is
unpersuasive and inconsistent with Congress, the Sega court should have
determined whether Accolade's copying of entire Sega programs was
"reasonable" with regard to promoting copyright's aim. 3'
4.

FourthFactor:Effect on the Market Value of the Original

The court's rationale in considering the fourth factor also was
unpersuasive. Even though Accolade created videogames that directly
competed with Sega's,'32 the court wrongfully concluded that Accolade's
infringement would only affect Sega's videogame sales indirectly and
cause Sega only minor economic loss. 3
First, the court erred in believing that Sega's market value would go
unscathed because it thought consumers typically buy more than one
videogame of the same type.'34 Instead, most consumers cannot afford to,
nor would want to, purchase two similar videogames. Hence, Sega likely
would suffer significant revenue losses as more companies follow in
Accolade's footsteps to make their games Genesis-compatible.' 35
Moreover, if reverse engineering of Sega's code were to become widespread,'36 Sega not only would lose substantial profits, but some of its
games might be completely usurped by rival games.
In addition, Sega is now at serious risk of losing its licensing
opportunities. Instead of purchasing a license from Sega, those wanting
to develop Genesis-compatible videogames can simply reverse engineer
Sega's software. Surprisingly, the court never addressed the potential

130. See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S.Ct. 671 (1994); Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Hubco Data
Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450, 456 (D. Idaho 1983). But
see Sega, 977 F.2d at 1518-19 (glossing over numerous cases that held intermediate copying an
infringement); Soma et al., supra note I01, at 209-11 (discussing cases that held intermediate
copying to be non-infringement).
131. See infra parts III.B.3., IV.A.2.c.
132. For example, Accolade's "Mike Ditka Football" obviously targeted the same consumers who
were likely to purchase Sega's "Joe Montana Football." Sega, 977 F.2d at 1516, 1523.
133. Id. at 1523-24.
134. Id.
135. The Sega court failed to consider the effect on Sega's potential market if the infringing use
were to become "widespread." Id. at 1523-24, 1527. Sega focuses on the infringing use of only one
competitor, Accolade. Id.
136. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994) (looking at market effect if
"widespread conduct" occurred).
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harm this posed to Sega's existing licensing markel'
despite its
knowledge that other developers already had purchased Sega licenses.'
The court also ignored why Sega created the TMSS software for
Genesis.' 39 Contrary to the court's belief, Sega's licensing system
indicated that Sega was not trying to make it "impossible for others to
compete"' 40 so that it could monopolize the Genesis-corapatible videogame market. First, Sega had offered licenses to those wanting to
develop Genesis-compatible videogames. These licenses were an
essential component of Sega's goal to prevent pirated 4 ' videogames
from operating on Genesis.' 42 Second, through licensing, Sega also hoped
to regulate the types, not quantity, of videogames that could operate on
its proprietary Genesis system so as to protect Sega's ove-rall quality and
customer satisfaction. 43 By not recognizing the detrimental effect that
Accolade's disassembly would have upon Sega's market value, the court
unjustly trivialized Sega's incentives for developing Genesis.'"
It is tempting to conclude that the court molded its analysis to support
a predetermined outcome, and thus, did not give ser.tous regard to
copyright law's objective. The court might well have found in favor of
Sega rather than Accolade. 45 Unfortunately, because fair ase is based on
the flexible "equitable rule of reason" principle, courts, as in Sega, may
engage in an approach that insufficiently considers copyright's ultimate
aim.

137. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523. Perhaps the Sega court never addressed this issue because it was
more interested in "facilitating the entry of a new competitor" against Sega. Id.
138. Id. at 1514.
139. Miller, supra note 31, at 1020.
140. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24.
141. The term "pirated" as used here and by the court means copying software verbatim so that
the end product is an identical duplication of the original software. Under U.S. copyright law, pirated
software (or "piracy") is considered an inexcusable infringement. See, e.g., Karjala, supranote 27, at
975-76, 985, 1012.
142. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515-16.
143. Id. at 1514-16.
144. Copyright protection is seen usually as providing a limited monopoly incentive to authors to
stimulate their creativity. Miller, supranote 31, at 1020-21; Wald et al., supra note 27, at 504-06.
145. See infra parts II.B.2., IV.A.2.d.
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III. CAMPBELL'S APPROACH FOR A FAIR USE INQUIRY
A.

The Facts and Holding of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music

In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote and recorded the song
Oh, Pretty Woman. In 1989, Luther Campbell, the lead vocalist and song
writer for the musical group "2 Live Crew," wrote what he called a
parody-rap of Oh, Pretty Woman, entitled Pretty Woman. Upon
Campbell's request for permission to use music and lyrics from the
original, Acuff-Rose (the copyright owner of Oh, Pretty Woman) refused
to "permit the use of a parody" of Oh, Pretty Woman.'46 Despite this
rejection, Campbell released his rap. As a result, Acuff-Rose sued for
copyright infringement. The trial court granted summary judgment to
Campbell, reasoning that Campbell's commercial purpose was no bar to
a finding of fair use because his song was a parody."'
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court's decision.
The court accepted Campbell's argument that his song was a parody but
still found that the lower court wrongfully neglected the fact that
Campbell's infringement was for a commercial purpose and thus an
unfair use. The court mainly based its rationale on Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that "'every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively ...unfair."" 4 The court concluded that the parody-rap's
"blatantly commercial purpose . . . prevent[ed] [Campbell's infringement] from being a fair use."' 4 9 The Supreme Court, however, reversed
and remanded the case, holding that Campbell's parody could be a fair
use despite its commercial purpose. 5
B.

The U.S. Supreme Court'sFairUse Analysis

The U.S. Supreme Court held that because Campbell's song involved
a "transformative use" the appellate court had erred in giving dispositive
The Court stated that an
weight to its commercial character.'
infringement is transformative if it "adds something new, with a further
146. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1168 (1994).

147. ld.at 1166.
148. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,451 (1984)).
149. Id. at 1439.
150. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1179.
151. Id.
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purpose or different character, altering the [original. with new
expression, meaning, or message" so that the infringement avoids
superseding or supplanting the original's expression cr purpose.152
Although other courts and commentators have on occasion mentioned a
transformative use approach for the fair use analysis,' 53 Campbell is the
first U.S. Supreme Court case to utilize this concept.
1.

FirstStatutory Factor:Purpose and Characterof the Infringement

The Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's holding that an infringement's
commercial character conclusively weighed against fair use.154 It
specifically criticized the Sixth Circuit for not considering the
transformative character of Campbell's parody-rap.' 55 The Court
announced that an infringement's transformative purpose makes its
commercial purpose less significant because such uses usually further
copyright's ultimate goal.' 56 The Court based this statement, in part, on
the Act's clear intent that57an infringement's commercial character is only
one element to consider.
2.

FourthFactor:Effect on the Market Value of the Original

The Court stressed that a strong likelihood of a transformative use
could rebut the presumption that an infringement having a commercial
purpose caused unfair market harm. 5 The Court explained that although
market substitution of an original almost always indicates market harm,
unfair substitution and harm were unlikely to occur with a transformative
use. 5 9 The Court held that Campbell's song was unlikely to cause unfair

152. Id. at 1171. In applying this concept, the Court relied on Judge Leval's commentary, see
Leval, supra note 33, at 1111, and also on Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony, 464 U.S. at 478--0
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
153. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1375 (2d Cir. 1993);
American Geophysical Union v. Texac, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1,12-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d
881 (2d Cir.), amended and superseded by 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); William W. Fisher Ill,
Reconstructing the FairUse Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1659, 1768 (1988); Leval, supra note 33,
at 1105-10.
154. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1173-74, 1179.
155. Id. at 1179.
156. Id. at 1171.
157. Id. at 1174 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994)).
158. "No 'presumption' or inference of market harm . . .is applicable to a case involving
something beyond mere duplication for commercial purposes," Id. at 1177.
159. Id. at 1177-78.
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market harm because parodies usually represent a different type of work
and serve a different audience than the original works. 6
Second and Third Factors:Nature of the CopyrightedMaterialand
the Amount and Substantialityof the OriginalCopied

3.

Instead of relying on the presumption that the nature of the
copyrighted original weighs against fair use if the original is of a
fictional or creative nature,' 6' the Court scrutinized the nature of the
infringement rather than the original that had been infringed. 62 By
stating that parodies almost always target and utilize copyrighted
material to build newly creative and fictional works, the Court 6suggested
that the nature of parodies justifies a certain degree of copying. 1
Likewise, rather than simply stating that considerable copying tended
to weigh against a finding of fair use," the Court held that substantial
copying only sometimes could indicate that the infringement lacked a
sometimes could cause unfair
transformative character and, thus, only
65
market harm to the copyrighted work.
C.

Campbell 's "Transformative Use" Concept Revives the
"ProductiveUse" Theory

Though the Court employed the phrase "transformative work" several
times in its discussion, it intended the phrase to be equivalent to the term
"transformative use." Several statements by the Court support this
observation. First, and most importantly, the Court repeatedly modified
"use" with "transformative."' 66 Further, when the Court first mentioned
160. Id.
161. Fictional works generally receive more copyright protection than factual or functional works.
Id. at 1175; Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied,385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
162. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171. The fair use statute, however, mandates that courts focus on
the nature of the original copyrighted work, not on the nature of the infringing work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(2) (1994); Harper& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985).
163. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175-76.
164. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560; Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417,450 (1984).
165. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175-76.
166. For example, the Court stated: "Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary
for a finding of fair use .. ", id. at 1171; verbatim copying "may reveal a dearth of transformative
character or purpose .... with little added or changed, [and thus] is more likely to be a merely
superseding use.", id. at 1176; "But when ... the second use is transformative .... ", id. at 1177;
"No such evidentiary presumption is available to address either the first factor, the character and
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the transformative use theory, it cited Judge Leval's article that argues
how "transformative uses" are infringements that deserve the fair use
exception. 167 Moreover, copyright law never differentiates between the
types of infringements that can occur, but only conside:rs whether any
infringement actually has transpired and equates intermediate copying
with permanent copying. 168 Hence, although Campbell involved only a
"permanent" copying of copyrighted expression, the Court likely would
accord the same treatment to an infringement consisting of only
intermediate, rather than permanent, copying.
Of even greater significance, however, the Court revived the theory
169
that "productive uses" play an important role in a finding of fair use.
This revival is evidenced by the Court's favorable citation to Judge
Leval's explanation of how a transformative use is ftndamentally a
productive use. 7 ' Furthermore, the Court specifically relied on Justice
Blackmun's discussion in Sony about why productive uses were
generally fair uses.17 ' As a result, it is clear that the Court's
transformative use concept is essentially the productive use theory. 72
In short, Campbell establishes the following new fair use concepts:
(1) the preamble to the fair use statute 73 provides only illustrative uses
that might promote copyright's purpose; the four statutory factors, on the
other hand, are a subset of copyright's objective, and as such, only by
evaluating the four statutory factors is a court competent to determine
purpose of the use, or the fourth, market harm, in determining whether a transfcrmative use, such as
parody, is a fair one.", id. at 1179.
167. Id. at I17 1; see also Leval, supranote 33, at 1111.
168. See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9:h Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994); Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Hubco Data
Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450,456 (D. Idaho 1983).
169. "Productive uses" are those in which copiers ultimately build onto the works of others by
adding their own original contribution and creativity to that which is copied. See Leaffer, supra note
13, at 320-21. Before Sony Corp. of.America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., many believed that for
an infringement to be a fair use it had to be a productive use. See id.; Nimmer & Nimmer, supranote
59, at 13-163. The Court in Sony, however, held that a fair use did not necessarily have to be a
productive use. 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984). Some have believed mistakenly that the productive
use theory was no longer valid after Sony. See Leaffer, supra note 13, at 320-21; Nimmer &
Nimmer, supra note 59, at 13-163; Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's
Rescue ofFairUse, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 19 (1994).
170. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
171. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 478-80 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
172. The Court's definition ofa transformativ.-use is what others such as Judge Leval and Justice
Blackmun call a "productive use." See supranote 152 and accompanying text.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 107, supranote 37.
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whether an infringement necessarily advances intellectual growth and is
therefore a fair use;
(2) though a fair use is not necessarily 175a
use usually indicates a fair use;
transformative
a
use,
transformative
and (3) an infringement generally is not a fair use if it serves a
commercial purpose and fails to serve any transformative purpose.'76
D.

Campbell's Analysis Is Applicable to Non-Parody Contexts

Because transformative uses usually advance copyright's objective,'7 7
Campbell's approach also applies to non-parody contexts. Several
statements by the Court support a broad application of its new concept.
First, the Court stated that the central purpose behind considering "the
purpose and character of the infringing use"'78 is to inquire into the
extent an infringement serves a transformative purpose.'79 Thus, the
Court implicitly held that its transformative use concept was generally
applicable under any analysis of the first fair use factor.
Next, the Court also relied on its transformative use concept when
considering the third and fourth statutory factors. The Court explained
that inquiry into whether the infringer copied a substantial portion of the
original 8 ' was relevant because the answer could indicate a lack of
"transformative" character, which in turn might indicate unfair market
harm. 8' Similarly, in discussing the effect upon the market value,' the
Court explained that if an infringement is "transformative," then the
presumption that a commercial purpose will cause unfair market harm is
inappropriate because market harm is less likely to occur.' 83
As an example of Campbell's broad applicability to fair use disputes,
a recent decision by the Second Circuit expressly utilized Campbell's
transformative use concept in a dispute that solely involved

174. See 114 S.Ct. at 1171. The only other time Campbell refers to the preamble was to support
its rationale that "commerciality" was not presumptive under the first statutory factor. Id. at 1174.
175. Id.at 1171.
176. Id.at 1176-79.
177. Id.
at 1171.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994).
179. Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1171.
180.
181.
182.
183.

17U.S.C.§ 107(3) (1994).
Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175-76.
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1177-78.
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photocopying of copyrighted material." 4 The Second Circuit's
application of Campbell to a non-parody context is an excellent
illustration of how courts can enlist Campbell's approach to resolve fair
use disputes in all types of contexts, including those involving software.
IV. APPLYING CAMPBELL TO REVERSE ENGINEERING
A.

Why Campbell's Approach Should Be Applied

Campbell provides courts with a consistent and effective approach for
determining when reverse engineering of software is fair use. Equally
important, following Campbell would better promote copyright's
ultimate goal. 5 Compared to Campbell's approach, Sega's fair use
analysis is severely insufficient." 6 Unlike Sega, the Campbell Court
repeatedly and persuasively explained how its fair use analysis was
directly related to serving copyright's objective. 7 Thus, when applying
a fair use analysis to reverse engineering of software, courts and
Congress should rely on Campbell's approach rather than Sega's.
1.

GeneralScheme for Applying Campbell to Reverse Engineering

Because fair use is an affirmative defense, the infringing party still
must overcome the presumption that each of the four st:atutory factors
weighs against a finding of fair use.'8 8 This presumption, however, could
be rebutted if the reverse engineering had certain characteristics,
8
Specifically, courts would employ
including a transformative use.Y

184. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 888-92 (2c Cir.), amended and
superseded by 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
185. See supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing copyright's object ve). Also, by using
Campbell, courts could avoid Sega's two new requirements. See supranote 101.
186. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992). Some
have mistakenly assumed that Campbell indirectly affirmed Sega's fair use analysis and ultimate
holding simply because at the end of its first factor analysis the Court referred to Sega in a list of
cases cited to with the signal "[s]ee generally." Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174. See Wald et al., supra
note 27, at 504-05 (stating that Campbell affirmed Sega's underlying "rationale and policies").
Campbell does not cite Sega to illustrate that Sega's analysis and holding were correct. Campbell
cites Sega merely to illustrate that other cases also hold that an infringement's commercial purpose is
not dispositively indicative of an unfair use. 114 S. Ct. at 1174.
187. 114 S. Ct. at 1171-74.
188. Id. at 1177.
189. Because fair use is an affirmative defense, the defendant carries the burden to rebut. Id.
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Campbell's approach of balancing each of the four statutory factors' 90
solely with respect to copyright's goal of promoting intellectual growth.
Thus, a reverse engineering's "transformative use" characteristics (if
any) could counter, and perhaps outweigh, any of its unfair use
characteristics. 9' Campbell's approach, however, would not necessarily
mean that the infringement had to be a transformative use before it could
be a fair use. 9 2 The Court itself rejected any such rule. 3
2.

Applying Campbellfor Each Fair Use FactorAnalysis

a.

FirstStatutory Factor:Purposeand Characterof the Infringement

By adopting Campbell's analysis of the first statutory factor, courts
could persuasively explain why the commercial aspect of a reverse
engineering can be of less importance, or even ignored, under certain
circumstances. Under Campbell's approach, courts would infuse copyright's ultimate purpose directly into the first factor analysis.'9 4 For
example, if a reverse engineering is done merely for interoperability or
for accessing uncopyrightable ideas to develop or disseminate new
creative software, the infringement likely deserves the fair use
exception. 9 This type of reverse engineering should be excused because
it usually would promote copyright's ultimate aim without unjustifiably
stripping copyright protection from the original software.
Whereas the Sega court tried to minimize the commercial purpose of
an infringement that clearly had a commercial motive, Campbell's
approach would free a court to reconcile the commercial character of a
reverse engineering with the societal benefits of allowing utilization of
190. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S 417, 454, 455 nA0

(1984).
191. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177.
192. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40, 456, 479--80 (rejecting idea that every fair use must first be a
"productive use").
193. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 ("[Transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding
of fair use.").
194. See id. (stating that transformative uses generally further copyright's goal).
195. Some argue that any reverse engineering is unfair because technologically sophisticated
disguises might allow reverse engineers to pirate copyrighted expression in ways that are
undetectable. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 31, at 1026. But see Daughtry, supra note 8, at 152;
Kaijala, supra note 27, at 997; Oddi, supra note 8, at 371. In any event, a ban on all reverse
engineering would be detrimental to copyright's ultimate objective because software technology
advances by building on existing software. See generally Ignatin, supra note 33, at 2014-22;
Karjala, supra note 27, at 976--85, 996-98; see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
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uncopyrightable but hidden material. For instance, if the Sega court had96
first performed adequate fact-finding (and its fact-finding so dictated),1
then it could have reasoned under the following rationale ihat despite the
commercially-exploitative purpose of Accolade's reverse engineering,
the infringement was a fair use. First, Accolade's infringement merely
allowed access to Sega's uncopyrightable functions, which, in turn,
permitted Accolade to publicly disseminate its own works of authorship.
Hence, Accolade's commercial intent was outweighed by its strong
showing of transformative use of Sega's work. 97 Second, and more
importantly, in light of copyright's overall objective, this transformative
use also prevented Accolade's works from being unjustifiably denied
entry into society.' 9' This rationale is much more persuasive and
straightforward than the Ninth Circuit's current approach.' 9
b.

The Second Factor:Nature of the Copyrighted Work

Courts relying on Campbell could avoid contradictinig Congress's
expressed intent that software receive just as much copyright protection
as other literary works."' Courts could assert that the nature of creating
new software usually requires disassembly of existing software. Such an
argument would be persuasive because not only is software's object code
unintelligible without reverse engineering,0 ' but the creation of new
software tends to build on the ideas and functions of existing software. 0 2
c.

ThirdFactor:Amount and Substantialityof the OriginalCopied

Under Campbell's approach, courts could not gloss over the
significance of the third factor, as in Sega.20 3 Specifically, courts would

196. For example, fact-finding should have addressed, among other issues, xactly which Sega
interoperability specifications were copyright-protected and which were not. See .upra note 117.
197. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171.
198. See supra text accompanying note 111.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 98-112.
200. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
201. See supra part II.A.

202. See Ignatin, supranote 33, at 2014-22; Kajala, supra note 27, at 97645, 996-98. Cf. Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("[Cjopyight... encourages
others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work."); Leval, supra note 33, at
1109 ("Each advance stands on building blocks fashioned by prior thinkers.").
203. See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text (discussing Sega). Congress intended all
four fair use factors to be equally determinative. See supranote 53 and accompanying text.
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thoroughly analyze the third factor as Congress has mandated,2" and,
more importantly, they would do so in direct deliberation of copyright's
goal. For example, courts should weigh the third factor in favor of the
reverse engineer if the intermediate copying of an entire program is
"reasonable" with respect to promoting copyright's objective.2 5
d.

FourthFactor:Effect on the Market Value of the Original

By using Campbell, courts could avoid Sega's tenuous rationale for
why market harm caused by reverse engineering may not negate fair
use.2" 6 Instead, courts could explain how an infringement with a
commercially exploitative purpose can rebut the presumption of unfair
market harm if the infringement also has a transformative purpose.
For example, when reverse engineers disassemble copyrighted
software only to allow independently created programs2. 7 to enter the
market, or merely to develop new software programs that build solely
upon the uncopyrightable elements of existing software, any market
harm caused to the original should be considered fair. The resulting
market harm is excusable because it justifiably.S promotes the
dissemination of creative expression, which in turn promotes society's
intellectual growth.2" 9 Similarly, though software developers also might
allege that reverse engineering causes them to lose licensing
opportunities,"' this type of market harm is fair. Market impairment of
licensing opportunities for a program's functions and interoperability
204. See supra notes 46. 52-55 and accompanying text.
205. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1175-76 (1994) (discussing how
"reasonable" infringement can be fair use); supra note 41 and accompanying text. Because
unintelligible object code prevents one from differentiating between a software program's
copyrightable and non-copyrightable material, intermediate copying of the entire program is not only
reasonable but often necessary for full comprehension of the program's ideas and functions. See
Ignatin, supra note 33, at 2008-10; Karjala, supranote 27, at 992-95.
206. See supranotes 130-33 and accompanying text (discussing Sega's rationale).
207. "Independently created works" are those that are not copied from another's work but rather
whose originality was independently created by its author. See Leaffer, supra note 13, at 41-42.
208. The infringement is "justifiable" in the sense that the copyright holder has not been
needlessly stripped of any copyright protection over the original software. See supra text
accompanying notes 115. Here, the copyright holder is essentially losing no copyright protection
because copyright law never protected his softvare's ideas or functions to begin with. See supra note
16 and accompanying text.
209. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-79.
210. Software developers may allege that the ultimate works that result from reverse engineering
are additional infringements. This type of claim, however, is separate from that against reverse
engineering. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1528 (9th Cir. 1992).
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specifications is not actionable under copyright law becaase copyrights
do not protect authors from harm caused by the access to and utilization
of their ideas."'
By applying this type of rationale, the Sega court's conclusion could
have been the same, but now its analysis in reaching that conclusion
would have expressly discussed how Accolade's infringement served
copyright's ultimate plan. Though reverse engineering allowed Accolade
videogames to compete directly against Sega videogames3, and thereby
undoubtedly injure Sega's market value,"' this market harm was likely
fair. But it was not fair on the basis that it appeared to be "minor," ' 3 nor
because it appeared that Sega was attempting to monopolize the Genesis
videogame market.21 4 Instead, this market harm was fair because a
finding to the contrary would have unjustifiably suppressed Accolade's
independently created works of authorship from being disseminated, and
thus would have needlessly undermined copyright's ultimate aim.21 5
V.

CONCLUSION

If properly applied, Campbell could help resolve the uncertainty
regarding the fair use doctrine and reverse engineering of software. Not
only would Campbell's analysis prove effective for determining when a
reverse engineering warrants the label of fair use, but more importantly,
it would safeguard copyright's objective of advancing society's growth
in the arts and sciences.
Campbell demonstrates that the fair use doctrine does not solely
require an analysis of the four statutory factors, but that it commands,
foremost, consideration of copyright law's ultimate purpose.
Specifically, Campbell dismisses the notion that the four fair use factors
211. See supra note 16; see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349-50 (1991). Other forms of legal protection such as patents are specifically available to protect
ideas. See generally In Re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
212. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24.
213. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 137-38 (criticizing the court's rationale for
labeling the market harm to Sega as "minor").
214. See supranotes 142-44 and accompanying text. A copyright owner can It wfully monopolize
expression but not the market the expression serves. See CONTU Report, supranote 31, at 10-13.
215. It appeared that Accolade had only appropriated uncopyrightable funcronal elements that
were required for interoperability rather than any copyrightable expression from Sega's software.
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515-17. Moreover, intuition suggests that the competition that stems from new
independently created works of authorship entering into society will most likely "stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good." Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417,432 (1984).
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can be molded in any fashion thought to be "equitable." Instead,
Campbell shows how the fair use doctrine must be construed in a manner
that specifically serves the constitutional goal of promoting intellectual
growth. The four fair use factors are only benchmarks that help indicate
when a copyright infringement bolsters, rather than undermines, this
constitutional goal.
Other countries, weary of waiting for U.S. courts or Congress to act,
have begun to enact their own copyright laws that specifically address
reverse engineering of sofware.21 6 Until U.S. courts and Congress
address this issue again, the U.S. software industry, one of the most
profitable industries in our nation, must remain in a state of uncertainty.
Meanwhile, international rivals, capitalizing on straightforward laws on
reverse engineering, are free to invest in expensive software development
and enter emerging markets.

216. See, e.g., Marc A. Ehrlich, FairUse or Foul Play? The EC Directiveon the Legal Protection
ofComputer Programsand Its Impact on Reverse Engineering, 13 Pace L. Rev. 1003 (1994); Herald
Jongen & Alfred P. Meijboom, Copyright Software Protectionin the EC (1995); supra note 69 and
accompanying text.

